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ANTITRUST AND THE PUBLIC DEFENDANT:
APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
Leslie W. Jacobs*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Government activities routinely impinge upon competition in the
commercial marketplace. And for forty years the resulting antitrust debate has centered on the liability of private parties who either sought or
complied with anticompetitive government directives. The question now
frequently arises whether anticompetitive conduct of a governmental
entity is itself subject to the proscriptions of the federal antitrust laws.
An affirmative answer has exposed a vast new class of prospective defendants and identified a fascinating array of liability, damages, and
trial-tactics issues.
The range of vulnerable conduct is staggering. Governmental entities issue permits and licenses which, in many instances,1 are few in
number relative to the pool of qualified applicants. Likewise, franchises
may be granted by governmental bodies for the operation of commercial enterprises that have economic viability only when the number of
entrants is severely restricted. 2 Present and potential competitors may
also be adversely affected by governmental decisions regarding such
disparate matters as procurement, bond issues and other public finance,
zoning,' regulation,' condemnation, annexation,' and highway access.
* Partner, Thompson, Hine and Flory, Cleveland, Ohio. B.S., Northwestern University
(1965); J.D., Harvard University (1968). This article has been adapted from a speech given by
the author in conjunction with the 103d Annual Meeting and Convention of the Ohio State Bar
Association, before the Antitrust Law Section, with revisions to reflect subsequent developments.
The author was assisted in the preparation of his remarks and this article by Gary S. Cullen.
I. Liquor licenses and common-carrier certificates, for example, are often limited in number
and can represent the principal assets of the holders. Vendor, zoning, building, occupancy, and
sanitation permits are typically more plentiful and available to all applicants satisfying objective
criteria.
2. Enterprises for which public franchises are typically granted include cable television,
taxis, and concessions at public facilities. The state of Hawaii's award of exclusive concession
rights at the Honolulu International Airport has spawned a great deal of antitrust litigation. See,
e.g., Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 712 (D. Hawaii
1983) (taxicab concessions); Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 553 F. Supp.
976 (D. Hawaii 1983) (foreign exchange concession). Cable television antitrust litigation has included Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Hopkinsville
Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982); Affiliated
Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 519 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 226, reh'g
granted en banc, 714 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983) (No. 81-2335).
3. Zoning decisions have been challenged under the antitrust laws in Westborough Mall,
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Governmental entities also frequently engage in operating facilities"
and providing utility7 and other services. 8 Thus, whether as supplier,
customer, competitor, or regulator, the government is often a key participant in the marketplace.
The types of potential violations by government instrumentalities
are also quite numerous, running the gamut from monopolization (particularly where access is denied to essential facilities) to price discrimination. Governmental entities may find occasion to enter into all varieties of horizontal agreements which run afoul of the antitrust laws
when effected by private parties-including agreements to control output, fix prices, allocate territories and/or customers, and join in group
boycotts. Similarly, an instrumentality may engage in proscribed vertical restraints, such as resale price maintenance, tie-ins, reciprocity, territorial or customer restrictions, refusals to deal, and exclusive dealing
and requirements contracts.
This article will discuss the impact of the antitrust laws on various
governmental entities. The antitrust laws affect, in varying degrees, the
federal and state governments, municipalities, and private actors under
governmental direction. The applicability of the laws to each actor
Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2122
(1983); Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,352 (N.D. Iowa 1983); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1982).
4. Activities and items commonly regulated include gambling, lotteries, sales of liquor, securities issues, and insurance policies and rates. Regulation is also achieved through requirements
regarding incorporation and qualifications to do business, and through codes such as those for fire
and safety.
Regulation of professionals through licensing and disciplinary proceedings has also engendered antitrust litigation. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub
nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
5. A city's requirement that neighboring towns agree to annexation as a condition to receiving sewage-treatment services was challenged in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d
376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3891 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 82-1832). See
infra text accompanying notes 56-68.
6. Examples of such public facilities are airports, arenas and stadiums, golf courses, swimming pools, skating rinks, beaches, parking lots, public buildings, and concessions.
7. Utilities such as water, electricity, gas, and sewer and waste disposal are commonly provided at the local level. Antitrust challenges to such activities are found in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (electricity service); City of Eau Claire, 700
F.2d 376 (1983) (sewage-treatment services); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d
1187 (6th Cir. 1981) (solid-waste disposal services), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 931 (1982);
Central Iowa Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d
419 (8th Cir. 1983) (solid-waste disposal services); Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105
Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 321 (1982) (sewage-treatment services).
8. Other services may include street and highway construction and maintenance, ambulances. local transit, fire and property protection, hospitals and emergency care, schools, and dispute resolution.
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raises separate questions of the intended scope of, as well as the exemption and immunity from, antitrust liability. As will be explored later,
such questions today arise in a climate of marked uncertainty; still unanswered by the courts are issues raised by concerns of federalism and
political accommodation. This article will discuss these problems and
attempt to discern some of the contours of this unsettled area of the
law.
II.

GOVERNMENT EXEMPTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

LAWS
A. Federal Government Liability: The Problem of Accommodating
Constitutional Principles and Ambiguous CongressionalIntentions
There is no question that, subject to separation of powers principles, Congress could subject the federal government itself and its personnel to liability for actions violative of antitrust principles. The question is simply whether that has been done. The answer lies in the
construction given to the antitrust statutes themselves and a reconciliation of the statutes with other legislative policies.
Occasionally, federal regulatory legislation provides a specific exemption from the antitrust laws. The question then becomes one of
interpreting the extent of the statutory exemption and the terms of the
agency's approval."0 In other situations the antitrust laws apply, but
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce them is vested in a regulatory commission. 1 The result is a de facto exemption.
The shift of regulatory control to commissions and federal agencies has been mandated by the need for more responsive control of

9. See, e.g., Shipping Act § 15, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Federal Communications Act § 221(a), 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1976); Federal Communications Act ch. 10, § 1, 47
U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (1976); Interstate Commerce Act §§ 5(11), 5(b)(9), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10706,
11343 (Supp. V 1981) (provisions relating to horizontal-rate agreements and control transactions,
respectively); Federal Aviation Act § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (Supp. V 1981); cf. Clayton Act § 7,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). See also Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 349 n.17 (1959). Even express exemptions must be narrowly construed. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States,
362 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1960); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316
(1956). Even when agency action has favored the defendant, the defendant should still bear the
burden of proving that an exemption from the antitrust laws exists. Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York
Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Fredrickson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 389 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (N.D. 11. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 525 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1975).
10. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir. 1974), affid, 422 U.S.
659 (1975); United States v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc., 1974-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V 74,888
(D.D.C. 1974); cf In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 380 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Mo.
1974).
Ii. See, e.g., Pan Am., 371 U.S. 296 (1963); cf. Midwest Milk, 380 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.
Mo. 1974).
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those industries which are essential to the country's welfare. Such flexibility is not, however, without its problems. Some types of antitrust
violations, for particular industries, are completely ignored by statutory
and agency regulation." It is in this area that general principles have
been announced to the effect that antitrust exemptions should not be
inferred lightly 3 and that the existence of "a highly regulated industry
critical to the Nation's welfare makes the play of competition not less
important but more so."" The problem is fundamentally one of accommodating ambiguous congressional intentions. Where Congress has not
spoken clearly, the Supreme Court has concluded that the antitrust
laws may be avoided only if and to the minimum extent necessary to
make a regulatory scheme work. 15
Where there is neither a clear statutory exemption nor exclusive
agency jurisdiction over an antitrust issue, a strategic battle looms over
the proper forum to hear the dispute. The courts have developed the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction to help resolve this threshold issue."
Because of the emphasis placed on administrative expertise" and the
prevention of inconsistency within the agencies' areas of responsibility, 8 application of the doctrine frequently results in resolution of the

12. See California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485-88 (1962); Fredrickson,
389 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. 111.1974); Marnell v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 260 F. Supp.
391, 410-11 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (motion to stay denied), decided on the merits, 1971 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 73,761 (N.D. Cal. 1971); cf. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 1973-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 74,824, at 95,669 (D. Or. 1973), affd, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 437 U.S. 322 (1978).
13. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (citing California v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)); Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 489 F.2d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 991 (1974); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 606 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); cf. Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1973); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324
U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945).
14. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963).
15. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); cf PhiladelphiaNat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51.
16. See, e.g., Midwest Milk, 380 F. Supp. at 884-88.
17. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113, 115 (1973) (commodity
exchange rules); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973) (commodity exchange rules); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 573-75 (1952) (dual shipping
rate); Quigley v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 376 F. Supp. 342, 355-56 (M.D. Pa. 1974); cf Southwestern
Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411, 420-21 (1959) (exculpatory
clauses in shipping contracts). It has been pointed out that when the issue is the construction of
the antitrust laws, as opposed to the principal regulatory responsibilities of an agency, "the courts
of the United States [rather than the agencies] have over the years become the repository of
antitrust.expertise." Thill Sec. Corp., 433 F.2d at 273.
18. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440 (1907); cf.
McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659, 665-67 (8th Cir. 1962). But see Radio
Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334 (1959); Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285
(1922). It is, of course, a misconception blindly to assume that an agency always promotes consis-
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jurisdictional issue in favor of a regulatory agency, but with ultimate
antitrust merits jurisdiction remaining in a district court.1 9
All of this gloss is highly suggestive of antitrust primacy over most
other federal legislation. Moreover, the fact that the sovereign immunity defense has been eliminated in all actions for specific, nonmonetary relief instituted against a United States agency, officer, or employee acting in an official capacity 20 raises the prospect of antitrust
actions being successfully brought. However, several courts have now
held that United States instrumentalities are not "persons" within the
meaning of the Sherman Act." Thus, the focus of litigation will apparently continue to be whether the actions of privateparties taken pursuant to federal regulation are exempt from the federal antitrust laws. If
such actions are not exempt, federal entities may themselves be exposed. Although a federal official's or agency's action may be invalid
because of an inconsistency with or a failure to consider an antitrust
principle without statutory authority, there will be no public antitrust
liability under the present state of the law. Nevertheless, as other governmental entities and their officials face increased exposure to antitrust penalties, one can only ask why a federal distinction should be
perpetuated.
B. State or Municipal Regulation or Operation of an Economic Activity versus the Federal Antitrust Laws: Issues of Federalism
There is almost no federal legislation providing specific antitrust
exemptions for state agencies or activities. Moreover, unlike United
States instrumentalities, 2 state instrumentalities are "persons" within
the meaning of the Sherman Act. 3 Consequently, state or local govern-

tency in its own proceedings. See Jacobs, Regulated Motor Carriers and the Antitrust Laws, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 90, 120-21 (1972).
19. For a discussion questioning the propriety of vesting jurisdiction in the regulatory
agency, see Jacobs, State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
221 (1975).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
21. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming dismissal of suit against railroad wholly owned and operated by the United States and the
agencies and officials responsible for its supervision), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Jet Courier Servs., Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 713 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1983) (dismissing action
against Federal Reserve Banks); Medical Ass'n v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 955 (M.D. Ala. 1983).
Federal exemption has also been found on alternative theories. See, e.g., Galahad v. Weinshienk,
555 F. Supp. 1201 (D. Colo. 1983) (action against federal district court judges alleging federal
bar admission requirements violate Sherman Act-dismissed on basis of implied displacement of
antitrust law, rather than on basis that judges are not "persons" within the meaning of Sherman
Act).
22. See the cases cited in Jacobs, supra note 19.
23. This is an ironic fallout of standing. Cf. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C.
U.S. 1047 (1973).
denied, 4041983
Cir. 1971),
Published
bycert.
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ments must find an alternate basis for exemption from the antitrust
laws.
In the absence of clear congressional intent to impose federal antitrust law under the supremacy clause,2" the concept of federalism has
provided the basis for state exemption. In its five to four decision in
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association v. Abbott Laboratories,2 5 the Supreme Court found the requisite congressional intent in
the language of the Robinson-Patman Act, at least as to sales of products at discriminatory prices to state and local government enterprises
for resale by them in competition with private retailers. 6 The majority
reached its decision by negative implication from the terms of the Act,
which provide only one express exemption from the sweep of the statute," but not for all activity by a governmental facility. 8
It is the absence of clear congressional intent, however, which
prompts the courts to refuse to invoke Sherman Act principles to restrain state economic regulation. This doctrine had its origin in the
seminal case of Parkerv. Brown2 9 in which the-Supreme Court refused
to enjoin enforcement of a state agricultural proration program for the
marketing of raisins. Under the program, a California state official was
authorized to approve output restrictions proposed by the raisin growers themselves in order to maintain prices. The Court found nothing in
the Sherman Act or in its history indicating a congressional intent "to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature."' 0 Citing principles of federalism, the Court indicated that
"an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and

24. See the discussion of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), and its progeny infra text
accompanying notes 29-53.
25. 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983).
26. In that case, a nonprofit corporation of pharmacists in Jefferson County, Alabama,
brought an action under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, charging that its
members were injured because drug manufacturers offered lower prices to competing pharmacies
that operated in conjunction with a county hospital and the University of Alabama's hospitals.
27. The only express exemption is that for nonprofit institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
The Court stated that the district court had properly assumed, for purposes of summary judgment, that at least some of the hospital purchases would not be covered by the § 13(c) exemption.
103 S. Ct. at 1014 n.8.
28. Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented, finding an inconsistency
between the majority's assumption that there is an exemption for purchases for a state's own use
and the principles of statutory construction upon which the majority relied. According to the
dissent, if the plain language of the statute is controlling, there should be no distinction between
purchases for resale and purchases for consumption. 103 S. Ct. at 1029 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent maintaining that while federal, state, and local agencies
are "purchasers" within the meaning of the Act, the Act is inapplicable because such agencies are
not in "competition" with private firms. id. at 1024 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
30. Id. at 350-51.
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agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."31
After thirty years of passive acquiescence in a seemingly broad
exemption, the "state action" doctrine articulated in Parker was narrowed by a series of seven Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1975.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,3 2 state action immunity was denied
for a schedule of minimum fees published by a county bar association
and indirectly enforced through issuance by the state bar of ethics
opinions suggesting that failure to adhere to the fee schedules might
lead to charges of misconduct.33 Although the state supreme court retained ultimate control over lawyer discipline, it did not compel the
anticompetitive activities of either group so as to make those activities
constitute state action." Demanding that the state compel the anticompetitive action before allowing state action immunity greatly restricted
the possibility of inferring state authorization.
The following year, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.," the Court
held that a utility's long-standing practice of including light bulb cost
in the electricity charge and providing replacement light bulbs to consumers without additional charge was not exempt from antitrust attack
by virtue of the state public utility commission's approval of the practice."6 The precedent was clear: in order for private parties delegated
certain state powers to enjoy state action immunity, there must be state
intent to displace the antitrust laws as well as state supervision of private actions.3
In contrast to its decision in Goldfarb, the Court held in Bates v.
State Bars8 that state action immunity applied to a rule against lawyer
advertising endorsed by a state bar.39 The Court noted that the role of
the state bar was completely defined by the state supreme court, which
in turn reviewed application of the rule in the course of enforcement
proceedings.40
In a controversial 1978 decision, the Court in City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.41 held that a municipal power company
was not exempt from antitrust liability. The Court so ruled because the
company's anticompetitive conduct was not pursuant to a state policy

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 351.
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
Id. at 776-78.
Id. at 790.

35. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 598.
Id. at 592-95.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 361-63.
Id. at 361-62.
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"to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service. ' '4S
For the first time the Supreme Court had disallowed a municipality
immunity, raising two "ominous specters."' "4At issue was whether public officials and local treasuries would become burdened by enormous
treble-damage judgments, and whether the federal courts would be
forced to review the actions of state and local agencies for procedural
irregularities.4 4 Chief Justice Burger, who cast the decisive vote in the
five to four decision, afforded some prospect for limiting the impact of
the decision when he indicated that state authorization would be necessary for immunity only when a municipality is engaged in "proprietary" enterprises.45
Later the same year, in New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W.
Fox Co.,46 the Court devised the "clear articulation" test for immunity.
The new test required that an anticompetitive program be consistent
with a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of state
policy to displace competition. In Orrin W. Fox Co., the Court held
that a California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships was immune from the antitrust laws. 7 The
Court found that the "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed"
goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom in
the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile
dealerships.""'
I The Court next articulated the "active state supervision" requirement in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.4 9 This guideline descended from the requirement of "state
supervision" which was promulgated by the Court in Cantor. The
Court in Midcal indicated that it may not always suffice, for purposes
of antitrust immunity, that a challenged restraint is one which is
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, at least
where the restraint is established by a private party rather than by a
government agency or official.5 0 The Court held that a California resale
price maintenance system which affected all wine producers within the
state was not entitled to antitrust immunity because there was no active supervision by the state of the privately established resale price

42. Id. at 413.
43. Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 HARV. L. REV. 435,
435 (1981).
44. Id.
45. 435 U.S. at 418-26. See infra text accompanying notes 91-98.
46. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
47. Id. at 109-11.
48. Id. at 109.
49. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
50. Id. at 105-06.
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schedules.5"
Finally, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
the Court held that an emergency ordinance enacted by Boulder pursuant to its home rule powers prohibiting a cable television operator from
expanding its business into other areas of the city for a period of three
months was not exempt from antitrust scrutiny as an action of the state
of Colorado. The Court found that Colorado's position regarding the
municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive was one of "precise
neutrality," and, therefore, the "guarantee of local autonomy" contained in the home rule amendment to the Colorado Constitution did
not fulfill 5 3the "clear articulation and affirmative expression"
requirement.
III.

STATE ACTION AFTER CITY OF BOULDER

The City of Boulder decision has engendered much consternation
among municipal officials and others, perhaps because they have assumed "that the Court's analysis of the exemption issue is tantamount
to a holding that the antitrust laws have been violated."5 In addition,
however, to the fact that the question of liability was not before the
Court, the holding in the case is merely that the Colorado home rule
amendment is not sufficient state authorization to exempt anticompetitive municipal conduct from antitrust scrutiny; it does not preclude
state authorization through specific statutory language or other types of
affirmative sanction. Thus, the true impact of City of Boulder will become apparent only as the courts address the more substantive issues
that remain in its wake.
City of Boulder was not really an antitrust decision at all, nor was
it a federal question in the true sense. Rather, the Court allowed itself
to play referee in a purely local political dispute between state legislatures and municipal governments on the effective allocation of the
states' powers in a federal system. Over Justice Rehnquist's dissent,
and with remarkably little acknowledgment of the nature of their task,
the majority seems to have blindly proceeded to implement an assumption that the powers of government within every state must simply mirror the structure of the Federal Constitution. The Court does not give
so much as lip service to the notion that a state's own constitution is
the proper-and indeed sole-source for resolution of such questions.
Once the assumption is made that even a home rule municipality can-

51. Id.
52. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
53. Id. at 55.
J.,concurring).
Id.eCommons,
at 58 (Stevens,1983
54. by
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not occupy the lawmaking status of a legislature, it is a small step to
conclude that a grant of home rule powers does not necessarily reflect a

state directive to engage in anticompetitive conduct.

A. "Clear Articulation," "Affirmative Expression," and "Active
State Supervision"--Applicability of the Midcal Test to Municipal
Conduct
Minimal guidance was provided in City of Boulder as to how pre-

cise state authorization need be in order to immunize municipal con-

duct from the federal antitrust laws. In addition, because the Court
concluded that Boulder's moratorium ordinance did not satisfy the

"clear articulation and affirmative expression" criterion,
it did not

reach the question whether municipal conduct-as opposed to private
conduct-must satisfy the "active state supervision" test focused upon
in Midcal.55
Those issues were faced squarely in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire.56 The Seventh Circuit examined whether the city's refusal to
provide sewage-treatment services to adjacent towns, unless the latter
would agree to annexation, was state action exempt from the antitrust
laws. 5 7 The towns filed suit seeking injunctive relief, alleging that the
city had violated the Sherman Act by using its monopoly over sewagetreatment services in the relevant geographic market to gain a monopoly in the markets for sewage collection and sewage transportation."8
The court felt compelled to address two preliminary issues raised
by the towns before turning to the issue of whether the city had acted
pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. First, the towns contended that the conduct which must be pursuant to state policy was the city's use of monopoly power in sewagetreatment services to monopolize sewage collection and transportation. 59 The court disagreed, noting that "in City of Lafayette, the [Supreme] Court [had] rejected the position 'that a political subdivision
necessarily must be able to point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization before it may assert a Parker defense to an antitrust

55.
56.

Id. at 51 n.14.
700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3891 (U.S. June 11, 1984)

(No. 82-1832). The city owned and operated the only sewage-treatment facility available to the
towns, thus enjoying a monopoly in the market for sewage-treatment services. It provided sewagetreatment services to individual landowners in the towns only if they agreed to become annexed by
the city and thereby obtain sewage-collection and transportation services from the city as well. id.
at 378.
57. Id. at 382-83.
58. Id. at 378 n.2.
59. Id. at 380.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/5
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suit.' "0 There was also expressed agreement with the Supreme Court

that "an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities of cities
and other subordinate governmental units exists when it is found

'"from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a par-

ticular area, that the legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of."' " The court then framed the relevant inquiry in terms of
whether the state had given the city authority to operate in the area of
sewage services and to refuse to provide treatment services. If so, then
it could be assumed that the state contemplated that anticompetitive
2
effects might result from conduct pursuant to that authorization.
The court also rejected the towns' contentiorr that the city must3
conduct.
point to a state policy directing or compelling the challenged
Instead, the court held that "any municipality acting pursuant to
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy which evidences an intent of the legislature to displace competition with regulation-whether compelled, directed, authorized, or in the form of a prohibition-is entitled to antitrust immunity because conduct pursuant to
such a policy would constitute state action.""
60. Id. at 381 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
415 (1978)).
61. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d at 381 (quoting City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1976), aff"d,
435 U.S. 389 (1978))).
62. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d at 381.
63. Id.
64. Id. As the court acknowledged, there has been a great deal of confusion over whether a
state must compel an instrumentality to undertake an anticompetitive activity in order to receive
immunity under Parker. According to the court, "[tihis confusion arose because of language in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar . . . and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. . . . which appeared to
require state compulsion as a prerequisite for municipal immunity." Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
In Goldfarb, state action immunity was denied for a schedule of minimum fees published by a
county bar association and indirectly enforced through issuance by the state bar of ethics opinions
suggesting that failure to adhere to the fee schedule might lead to charges of misconduct. Although the state supreme court retained ultimate control over lawyer discipline, it did not compel
the anticompetitive activities of either group so as to make those activities state action. 421 U.S.
at 791. In Ronwin v. State Bar, 686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin,
104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984), bar grading procedures allegedly designed to admit a predetermined
number of persons without reference to achievement by each applicant on a preset standard of
competence were alleged illegally to restrict competition among attorneys in violation of § I of the
Sherman Act. The Ninth Circuit cited Goldfarb in rejecting the defendants' argument that bar
grading procedures are immune from the federal antitrust laws. See also United States v. Texas
State Bd. of Accountancy, 464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (rule promulgated by state board
of accountancy not mandated or authorized by the state), modified, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 925 (1979). In First Am. Title Co. v. South Dakota Land Title Ass'n, 714 F.2d
1439 (8th Cir. 1983), the Eighth Circuit indicated its fundamental disagreement with the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits and held that regulations promulgated by the South Dakota Abstractors'
Board of Examiners (the state board which regulates the business of abstracting) constitute state
action immune from the federal antitrust laws, even though the challenged regulations were not
compelled by the South Dakota Legislature. Id. at 1429.
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The court in City of Eau Claire proceeded to find a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy not to burden municipalities with providing services unless they could annex the territory that
they service. 65 The court's decision was based upon a statute providing
that a city may fix the area into which to extend sewage services, 66 a
second statute providing that the department of natural resources may
order a city to extend its sewer system to a town but that such order
would become void if the town then refused to become annexed to the
city,17 and a state court decision deducing from these statutes a legislative belief that annexation constituted a reasonable quid pro quo for
the extension of sewer services to the annexed area."
Inasmuch as the City of Boulder Court did not resolve the issue, 69
the towns understandably also contended that the state of Wisconsin
must actively supervise the anticompetitive conduct for the city to be
entitled to state action immunity. The court again disagreed with the
towns, both as a matter of law and a matter of policy. 0 While acknowledging that active state supervision of private parties ensures that
they will not abuse the anticompetitive power given them by the state,
the court found that a local government performing a traditional municipal function operates pursuant to clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed restraint from the state's policies and delegation of authority, and, therefore, such activity is state action entitled to immunity
even though state supervision may not exist. 71 However, the court ex-

65. 700 F.2d at 382-83.
66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.069(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983).
67. Id. § 144.07(1) (West 1974).
68. 700 F.2d at 383 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314
N.W.2d 321 (1982)).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
70. We also conclude that requiring active state supervision over a traditional municipal
function would be unwise. A requirement of active state supervision would erode the concept of local autonomy and home rule authority which is expressed in the statutes and
constitution of Wisconsin. States would be required to supervise all local actions if municipalities are to avoid antitrust exposure, and courts would have to make the difficult determination of what "active" supervision is in terms of frequency and effectiveness. We doubt
that the Court in Midcal intended that the states spend their limited resources actively
supervising the traditional governmental functions of their municipalities so that they can
avoid antitrust liability.
700 F.2d at 384 (citation omitted).
71. In support of its conclusion, the court cites the following: P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW T
212.2a (Supp. 1982) ("requiring state authorization for local conduct is analogous to requiring
active supervision of private conduct; it tests whether challenged local activity is truly state action
and therefore entitled to immunity") (footnote omitted); Areeda, supra note 43, at 445 & n.50
("Lafayette does not require that government acts be . . . supervised by the state.") ("[a] few
courts erroneously appear to use the Midcal formula-clearly articulated state policy plus active
public supervision of private parties-to require state supervision of governmental defendants")
(footnote & citation omitted); Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a FederalistSystem, 1980
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/5
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pressly reserved the question whether a municipality undertaking anticompetitive activity that falls outside the scope of a traditional governmental function must be actively supervised by the state to receive

state action immunity."'
In City of Eau Claire and many other post-City of Boulder deci-

sions,73 the courts have experienced little trouble in finding the requisite state authorization for anticompetitive conduct. Following a grant

ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 341 ("It is questionable whether a showing of active state supervision is necessary for political subdivisions to gain Parker immunity, however, in spite of the seemingly unequivocal language of California Retail Liquor.").
72. 700 F.2d at 384 n.18. On remand, the district court in Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of
Akron found the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in City of Eau Claire equally applicable to the
case before it but found, in any event, that the municipal conduct in question was actively supervised by the state through the Ohio Water Development Authority, a state agency. 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
65,356 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Likewise, in Capital Tel. Co. v. City of Schenectady,
560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), involving an antitrust challenge to a city's denial of a request
for a franchise to establish a second landline telephone company, the court found it unnecessary to
determine whether the active supervision requirement must be imposed since it was clear that the
requirement was satisfied.
73. See, e.g., Pueblo Aircraft Serv., Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1982)
(city's inclusion of provision in lease agreements with fixed base operators at municipal airport
requiring the operators to purchase all aviation fuel from city for resale was not subject to antitrust scrutiny, where statute authorized city to acquire and operate a municipal airport and further provided that such acquisition and operation are "public, governmental functions, exercised
for a public purpose and matters of public necessity"); Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1983-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 65,352 (N.D. Iowa 1983) (zoning practices under a state-authorized urban renewal
program protected from antitrust attack by state action doctrine under Gold Cross Ambulance,
since challenged restraint is a reasonable consequence of the authorized activity); Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 563 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (city's refusal to renew a
taxicab company's license was state action immune from the antitrust laws because the city's
regulatory and licensing system for the taxicab industry was part and parcel of the state's public
utilities regulatory scheme); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennyroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562 F.
Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (city's decision to grant a cable television franchise to one firm rather
than another was immune from Sherman Act challenge where state constitution granted municipalities authority and responsibility to control the entry of public utilities-which, according to
the state's highest appellate court, included cable television-by requiring them to obtain a
franchise before operating within a municipality); Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City,
538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (city ordinance providing for single ambulance service company to provide ambulance service was protected by state action exemption from antitrust laws,
where statute provided that city may contract with one or more ambulance service providers),
a.ff'd, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983).
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit serves as a reminder that not
only must there be state authorization of anticompetitive conduct, but such conduct must be in
furtherance or implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. In
Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2122 (1983), the court stated that "[elven if zoning in general can be characterized as
'state action,' . . . conspiracy to thwart normal zoning procedures and to directly injure the plaintiffs [by rezoning competing developer's property from commercial to noncommercial] is not in
furtherance of any clearly articulated state policy." Id. at 746 (citations omitted). See also Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444 (D.S.C.
1983) (refusing to grant motion to dismiss where the allegation is that city conspired to violate the
than merely
antitrust laws,
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of general authority by the state to act in a given area, there is an
inference of state authorization if "the challenged restraint is necessary
to the successful operation of the legislative scheme . . .,. In Jordan
v. Mills,7 51 an antitrust challenge to the monopoly operation of a prison
store was blocked by state action immunity.76 Although no statute expressly provided for monopolization of prison stores or services, the
court cited general state regulation of prisons and stressed the necessity
of anticompetitive activity for effective prison management."
Conduct which a court classifies as essential governmental activity
is likely to be deemed authorized by a state as an extension of inference
by necessity. 8 By necessity, a city's imposition of anticompetitive restraints on certain critical services, such as a municipal ambulance service, will be considered to have been authorized by the state and
granted immunity to antitrust challenge. In the domain of critical services, cities have been permitted to regulate in a stricter fashion, even
without express state authorization. 9 In one such case, the Eighth Circuit inferred authorization for anticompetitive conduct in the construction of solid-waste disposal facilities in Central Iowa Refuse Systems,
Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan Solid Waste Agency.80 The court
noted that such an inference was permissible because the construction
was an essential governmental activity. 1 Conversely, the court readily
distinguished the instance of government construction of a swimming
pool, an activity to which immunity would not be extended via
inference. 82
Liberal inferences of authorization of municipal activity in the
rendition of traditional governmental services are but a logical extension of principles of federalism and political accommodation. 3 To disallow such inferences would interfere with the most vital of local activities in such areas as sewage disposal," ambulance services, 85 rapid
transit, and other services.
Notwithstanding this policy of liberal inference, many local politi-

74. Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted).
75. 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
76. Id. at 16-17.
77. Id. See generally Areeda, supra note 43, at 446-48.
78.. See Gold Cross Ambulance, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
79. Id.
80. 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 426-27.
82. Id. at 427-28.
83. See generally Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. Central Iowa Refuse Sys., 715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
85. Gold Cross Ambulance, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
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cal subdivisions are today concerned about antitrust liability. There
doubtless exist many municipalities whose activities are authorized only
by home rule powers similar to those found insufficient to confer state
action immunity in City of Boulder. Consequently, legislative proposals
are being developed to alleviate the perceived plight of municipalities
resulting from the City of Boulder decision.
At the federal level, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Strom
Thurmond and eight colleagues recently introduced a bill" which is
intended to clarify the application of federal antitrust law to local governments. The bill is based on a policy decision that, within reasonable
limitations, there exist no sufficient and compelling reasons to treat the
legitimate activities of local governments any differently than those of
state governments under the antitrust laws. Senator Thurmond indicated that the bill does not automatically extend protection from the
antitrust laws to local governments, but rather provides protection only
to the extent that state government entities would be protected for similar activity. In addition, the activity in question must otherwise be
valid under state law and must not involve the sale of goods or services
by the local government.8"
Maryland recently became the first state to react legislatively to
City of Boulder and preserve the state action defense for traditional
municipal activities such as planning and zoning, housing, sewage, and
refuse disposal." The laws do not purport to create or remove local
powers; instead, they merely "confirm existing powers of local governments to displace or limit competition" in specified areas. 9 The laws
further authorize the state attorney general to represent local governments in antitrust cases. " '

86. S. 1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 9505 (1983). H.R. 2981, 98th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1983), introduced May 1i, 1983, would limit local government antitrust exposure to
conduct for which a state would also be liable. H.R. 3361, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), contains a
similar provision to H.R. 2981 but, in addition, would amend the Clayton Act to limit antitrust
recoveries by private parties against state and local governments to actual damages, costs, and
attorney's fees.
87. S. 1578, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 129 CONG. REc. 9505, 9506 (1983).
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2A (Supp. 1983); id. art. 25, § 3D; id. art. 25A, § 5A; id.
art. 258, § 13B.
Other states have followed Maryland in enacting legislation to preserve state action immunity
for local governmental units. See Act of Nov. 3, 1983, 8 Il. Legis. Serv. 5548. The act states the
intent of the general assembly "that the 'State-action exemption' to application of federal antitrust laws be fully available to local governments to the extent their activities are either (1) expressly or by necessary implication authorized by Illinois law or (2) w/in traditional areas of local
governmental activity." Id. at 5549; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-05-01, 40-05-02, 40-05.1-06 (1983).
89. Maryland Becomes First State to Address Boulder Standards, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST

& TRADE

REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 1122, at 23 (July 7, 1983).

90. Id.
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The Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction

Another issue which remains unresolved after City of Boulder is
the status of the distinction-endorsed only by Chief Justice Burger in
City of Lafayette9 t-between governmental functions, as to which state
authorization would be unnecessary for antitrust immunity, and proprietary functions, as to which state authorization would be required. The
majority in City of Boulder9 and other post-City of Lafayette decisions9" have required state authorization without regard to the governmental/proprietary distinction. The Court has not, however, contraindicated the use of broad inference to satisfy the requirement of legislative
contemplation in areas of traditional governmental activity., In City of
Eau Claire, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested a
possible middle position, whereby state authorization would be required for all anticompetitive municipal activity but that active state
supervision would be required only with respect to anticompetitive activity that falls outside the scope of a traditional governmental function. 98 Senator Thurmond's proposed legislation also adopts a variation
of the governmental/proprietary distinction by excluding from statutory immunity a city's sale of services or products.
It certainly makes sense, as a matter of policy, to require equality
of treatment for public and private competitors in the commercial marketplace. The failure of local governments to advocate the principle is
probably less attributable to its supposed ambiguity than to their budgets. Of course, adoption of the governmental/proprietary distinction
would leave the availability of an antitrust exemption somewhat in the
hands of private interests, inasmuch as it could turn on evidence of
actual or potential competition. On the other hand, it would clearly
exempt purely regulatory activities like licensing and zoning, leaving
review of such activities to state administrative laws and politics.
There has also been offered contrary reasoning that state supervision under any circumstances is inappropriate for municipal activity.

91. 435 U.S. at 418-26 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
92. 455 U.S. at 55 n.14.
93. E.g.. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Inc., 455 U.S. 97,
105 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
94. In each post-City of Lafayette decision the activity was more properly classified as proprietary. Any attempt to expand on the Chief Justice's distinction would have been inapposite. In
City of Boulder, the court held that Boulder's cable television ordinances were contracts by the
city which represented a proprietary interest. 630 F.2d 704, 719 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S.
40 (1982). Boulder's involvement with cable television was explicitly for profit, contractually earning the city two percent of Community Communications Company's cable operation profits. Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 2846 (Oct. 6, 1964).
95. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983). The traditional governmental function at issue was that
of providing sewage-treatment services. See supra text accompanying notes 56-72.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/5
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The state supervision requirement is intended to guard against abuses
by private persons who become free to make anticompetitive decisions.

Supervision is also intended to keep the activity in line with the actual
policy goals of the state. This much seems clear; controversy exists,
however, with respect to who should most appropriately do the supervising. Because local officials are held politically accountable, anticompetitive abuses might best be minimized by the dissenting citizens

whom they represent." The Eighth Circuit, in limiting the applicability
of the active state supervision requirement, found the requirement of
state authorization of municipal conduct to be analogous to the require-

ment of active supervision for private conduct.9 7 Finally, though not
addressed by the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted in City of Boulder
that it would be inefficient and "odd" to require the state rather than
the city itself to supervise local activities. 98 After all, delegation of local
governmental decisionmaking was precisely the purpose of home rule
laws.
C. Standard of Review, Available Remedies, and City of Houston: A
Harbinger of Things to Come?
Like City of Lafayette before it, the City of Boulder decision

raises the "ominous specter" of public officials or treasuries burdened
by enormous treble damages.9 9 Indeed, the dissenters' opposition to the
City of Boulder holding was based in large part on the difficulties per-

ceived in developing an appropriate standard of review for municipal
conduct and in avoiding the imposition of treble damages after liability
is established. 100

96. Gold Cross Ambulance, 705 F.2d at 1014.
97. Id. (citing P. AREEDA, supra note 71). Anticompetitive conduct that is not expressly
authorized may be deemed to have been contemplated by the legislature if the conduct is reviewed
and supervised by the state. State supervision of anticompetitive activity may not be required to
establish Parker immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19. Active supervision may,
however, place the imprimatur of the state on otherwise independent activity. Llewellyn v.
Crothers, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,358 (D. Or. 1983) (construing Ronwin, 636 F.2d 692
(9th Cir. 1981)). "The court's opinion strongly indicates that had the Committee submitted the
grading proposal to the Supreme Court and the Court approved the proposal before its implementation, Parker immunity would have attached." Llewellyn, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 65,358, at
70,135.
98. 455 U.S. at 71 n.6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent, joined in by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, found issues of federalism controlling at the municipal level and would
apply the Midcal test by replacing state policy and supervision with city policy and supervision.
"[T]he federal interest ... is not infringed so long as the state or local regulation is so structured
to insure that it is truly government, and not regulated private entities, which is replacing competition with regulation." Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
99. Areeda, supra note 43.
100. 455 U.S. at 65-68.
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Application of the per se rule' 0 1 to municipal conduct is arguably
inappropriate since, as one commentator has noted, "[t]he premise of
per se treatment-a premise that may be crucially absent where government conduct is concerned-is that we already know enough from
experience and analysis about the pernicious character of the challenged conduct not to waste time in a lengthy analysis of the business
context or purported justifications.' 1 2 On the other hand, rule-of-reason' 08 treatment for governmental conduct could not easily be effected.
101. Under the per se rule, "certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of ahy redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958). "Per se rules of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its
procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per
se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to
justify the time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend
to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the bu'dens on litigants
and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials, . . . but those advantages
are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise,
all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and
undesirable rigidity in the law.
Id. at 50 n.16 (citations omitted).
102. Shenefield, Best Cases and Worst Cases, in ANTITRUST & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 122,
124 (J. Siena ed. 1982).
103. Under the traditional rule-of-reason analysis "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition." GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 (footnote omitted). The
classic statement of the factors to be considered in a rule-of-reason analysis was made by Mr.
Justice Brandeis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Only the effects of the restraint upon
competition are relevant in the rule of reason. Any other effect of the restraint, such as upon
public health or safety, "does not alter [the] analysis." National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). By enacting the Sherman Act, the legislature has determined "that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services." Id. The policy reflected in the Sherman Act "precludes inquiry" into whether competition is good or bad in a particular context. Id. Arguments that the effects of a restraint, other than
those upon competition, should be considered in reviewing the legality of the restraint are "properly addressed to Congress," but are not relevant in a judicial rule-of-reason analysis. Id. at
689-90. For a discussion of the ramifications in the municipality context and possible alternatives
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An accommodation of legitimate political and governmental interests
would require a clear departure from the traditional expression of the
rule-of-reason test and invite political second-guessing. In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States,1 the Supreme Court
held that an anticompetitive restraint could not be defended on the basis of a private party's conclusion that unrestrained competition posed
a potential threat to public safety and the ethics of a particular profession. A major concern voiced by the City of Boulder dissenters was
that, based upon the unequivocal precedent that only competitive considerations are relevant, a municipal ordinance "could not be defended
on the basis that its benefits to the community, in terms of traditional
health, safety, and public welfare concerns, outweigh its anticompetitive effects." 1 5
Upon reflection, this concern may be more apparent than real.
One commentator has contended that "[blenefits to the public do not
justify the anticompetitive actions of private parties, largely because it
is not the role of private parties to judge such benefits. Municipalities,
however, are organized precisely to promote the public health and
safety."106 Although this distinction evidences an unwarranted cynical
attitude about the role of professional ethics, it suggests that the ruleof-reason test could be modified for application to governmental conduct without imposing serious damage to the precedent applicable to
the conduct of private parties. An indication that benefits to health,
safety, and welfare may be weighed against anticompetitive effects in
municipal rule-of-reason cases was given in both City of Lafayette and
City of Boulder. The Court stated that "[i]t may be that certain activities which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by private
parties, take on different complexion when adopted by a local government. '10 7 Such benefits were actually considered by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Mason City Center Associates v. City of
Mason City." 8 Evidence tending to show that the city council was motivated by a desire for downtown development was deemed admissible
as a defense to a reputedly illegal anticompetitive agreement with the
development company in charge of the project.109 Such motives of a

to the traditional rule that only effects upon competition are relevant, see infra text accompanying
notes 105-09.
104. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
105. 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 62, 274 (1982) (citations
omitted).

107.

435 U.S. at 417 n.48; 455 U.S. at 56 n.20.

108. 468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 1146
(8th Cir. 1982).
109. 468 F. Supp. at 745.
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private developer for a boycott or monopolization would clearly be irrelevant, however.
Once liability is established, the possibility of a treble-damage
judgment looms large over any municipality. The apprehension of municipalities in this respect concerns, in fact, questions of the very ability
of governmental units to continue to function. This concern was forcefully expressed by the dissenters in City of Lafayette who suggested
that treble-damage awards may impair a government's ability to provide "life-sustaining services such as police and fire protection," ' 11 0 and
may even "assure bankruptcy for almost any municipality."" ' Another
concern is that the mere possibility of treble damages will encourage
nuisance suits and thereby deter desirable local regulation."' Worse
yet, since treble-damage awards would in effect be a levy on taxpayers,
the awards may have little actual impact on the actions of public officials. 13 Ironically, predictions of financial disaster presume that, but
for an exemption, government activities will frequently be found to violate the law and, of even greater consequence, that they are having a
profound actual damage impact on prospective plaintiffs. These factors
are inherent corollaries for the perceived need to limit the exposure of
the public treasuries.
But deciding that imposition of treble damages is inappropriate as
a matter of policy is only the first step in resolving the issue. A second
step involves a determination whether treble-damage awards against a
municipality can be denied without amending the antitrust laws. In his
City of Boulder dissent, Justice Rehnquist emphatically asserted that
they cannot, stating that "[iut will take a considerable feat of judicial
gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not subject to treble
damages .... ."I" However, both City of Lafayette and City of Boulder expressly left open the possibility that "remedies appropriate to redress violations by private corporations" might not "be equally appropriate for municipalities.'11 5 The same reasoning seems easily extended
to other governmental entities.

110. 435 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I 11. Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 106.
113. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (dismissing an award of
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a city since the Court could find no clear
congressional intent to make such awards available).
114. 455 U.S. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
115. 435 U.S. at 401-02, cited in 455 U.S. at 56 n.20. In any event, municipalities can be
expected to argue that treble damages are not available against them under the antitrust laws.
See, e.g., Scott v. City of Sioux City, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 165,203, at 71,847 (N.D. Iowa
1982) (deferring ruling on the issue until the close of the evidence, while noting that "the same
considerations [as in City of Newport, 453 U.S. 247 (1981)] are certainly present").
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A possible resolution of the treble-damages issue is suggested by
the Reagan administration's new legislative trade package,116 which
would limit trebling of damages to cases involving per se violations. If,
as suggested by then-Assistant Attorney General William Baxter in
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the actions of local
governments are to be evaluated under the rule of reason, a municipality's exposure under the antitrust laws would thereby be limited to single damages." 7
In Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of.Houston 1 8s however, a divided Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a horizontal
territorial market division, effected by competing cable television oper-

ators at the suggestion of the mayor of Houston and with approval of
the city council, was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Consequently, the court reversed the district court's granting of the de-

fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reinstated the jury's verdict of $2,100,000 in damages, subject to trebling.11 9 The court rejected the defendants' argument that, although a

116. Reagan Administration Approves Proposal for Antitrust, Intellectual Property Bill,
[Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1108, at 681 (Mar. 31, 1983).
117. Local Government Antitrust Liability: The Boulder Decision:t Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (statement of William F. Baxter,
then-assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
118. 700 F.2d 226, reh'g granted en banc, 714 F.2d 25 ( 5th Cir. 1983) (No. 81-2335).
119. Id. at 238. The facts as brought out at trial showed that in 1978 defendant Gulf Coast
Cable Television Company approached the city of Houston and applied for a cable television
franchise. The city did not follow the common practice of broadcasting its intention to award a
franchise, but instead passively accepted applications as they arrived. From the many applications
submitted, four emerged as strong contenders, including that of Gulf Coast, based on the political
strength of the men behind them. The mayor had let it be known that he did not want to choose
among the competing applicants but instead wanted the applicants to reach an agreement between
themselves for presentation to city council, which was in fact done.
During this period, plaintiff Affiliated Capital Corporation owned a savings and loan association and so was prevented from making application for a franchise due to a federal prohibition
against owning both savings and loan associations and cable television systems. After divesting
itself of the savings and loan association, however, plaintiff inquired into the status of the franchising process and was informed by Gulf Coast that the "pie had been cut." Affiliated's president
thereupon visited the mayor, who assured him that there was still time to receive a fair hearing.
Upon appearing before city council to request that his application be given due consideration,
Affiliated's president was advised by one councilman to reach an agreement with the other
franchise applicants. When he did not do so, the mayor and city council voted for the agreement
reached by the other applicants, whereupon Affiliated filed suit in federal court against Gulf
Coast, the mayor, and the city of Houston alleging that they had conspired to divide or allocate
territories in violation of § I of the Sherman Act.
The jury addressed two conspiracy theories in special interrogatories, finding that the agreement to allocate territories was not in violation of § I but that defendants did participate in a
conspiracy to limit competition in violation of § 1. Id. at 230. The district court granted defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis that plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that its injury was caused by anything other than defendants' boundary agreements.
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horizontal market division is a per se violation of section 1, the boundary agreements had no effect until they received the city council's
20
stamp of approval and were thereby removed from that category.1
The fact that the mayor and the council were involved was relevant

only as it related to questions of immunity.' 21 The court adopted the
district court's conclusion that the defendant cable operators were not
immune from liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine since a

public official (the mayor) was also a participant in the illegal conspiracy. 12 2 State action immunity was reasoned to be inapplicable because

none of the various statutes and constitutional provisions relating to the
cable television franchising issue demonstrated an intent on the part of
the Texas Legislature that the franchising process was to be operated
23
in an anticompetitive manner.'

On March 23, 1983, Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., then-deputy assistant
attorney general, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, indicated
that he was "stunned" by the City of Houston decision and was fearful
of the ramifications of three issues in the case: (1) allocation of authority between governmental bodies, (2) application of the per se rather
than the rule-of-reason analysis, and (3) the remedy ($2,100,000 in
damages, subject to trebling)."' It should be no surprise to find the
Antitrust Division filing an amicus curiae brief in support of a petition
25
for certiorariin this case.1
In addition to the availability of treble damages, other important
remedy issues include the nature and extent of injunctive relief and the

519 F. Supp. 991, 1009 (S.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 700 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1983).
120. 700 F.2d at 236.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 237. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, conduct which involves petitioning
the legislature for a change in an area of law is exempt from the Sherman Act. United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). This immunity applies even though the purpose of seeking a
change in the law is anticompetitive. Antitrust immunity will not apply, however, if the conduct
"ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor .... " Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
123. Id.
124. Address by Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., 31st Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section on
Antitrust Law (Mar. 23, 1983). Lipsky had indicated in an earlier presentation, however, that
treble damages may be appropriate in some instances-where independent municipal utilities entered into a single statewide price-fixing conspiracy, or if a city zoning commission established a
city-run or owned supplier monopoly of a product or service, such as dry cleaning, bookselling, or
television repairing. See A. Lipsky, Competitive Considerations in Local Governmental DecisionMaking (Oct. 21, 1982) (prepared for delivery in Tampa, Florida, before the American Law
Institute-American Bar Association course on the potential liability of local governments under
federal antitrust and civil rights laws).
125. The Fifth Circuit has granted a rehearing to the court en banc. City of Houston, 714
F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1983) (No. 81-2335).
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possible exposure of state and local governments and officials to criminal penalties. One genuine concern is that injunctive relief against a
governmental body provides the equivalent of federal administrative review of state actions under the guise of the antitrust laws. In addition,
a question remains whether a district court can properly impose governmental and political policies to correct or prevent antitrust violations. In regard to possible criminal liability, former Assistant Attorney
General William Baxter said that he could afford municipal officials
the assurance that criminal liability is not a realistic concern, but he
then promptly qualified that assurance with respect to officials covertly
abetting a clearly criminal conspiracy for their own benefit. 2 In fact,
the law provides no personal exemptions for government officials, and
reliance on prosecutorial discretion by temporary political appointees is
only slight comfort.'
IV.

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY

If actions of municipalities are not exempt from the antitrust laws,
municipalities might, in certain instances which involve traditional and
integral governmental functions, derive immunity from the tenth
amendment. In National League of Cities v. Usery,12 8 the Supreme
Court held that the ability to make fundamental decisions concerning
fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, parks, and
recreation is essential to the states' "separate and independent existence.' 1 2 9 Since local governments "derive their authority and power
from their respective States," interference with "integral government
services" provided by municipalities is "beyond the reach of congressional power under the Commerce Clause just as if such services were
provided by the State itself."' 30
The tenth amendment as a basis for an exemption from the antitrust laws was not before the Court in City of Boulder, but at least one
court since the City of Boulder decision has considered the impact of
the tenth amendment on the legitimacy of subjecting state action to
federal antitrust scrutiny. In Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron,"3 ' the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a city ordinance mandating that all garbage collected within the city of Akron be

126.
127.
cause such
128.
129.
130.
131.

Hearings, supra note 117, at 5-6.
Exemption and immunity are inapplicable to an official's anticompetitive conduct beconduct is done without his official capacity. City of Houston, 519-F. Supp. at 1017.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 851 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981).
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deposited at a single disposal operation controlled by the city was immune from application of the Sherman Act. This was based on two
different theories: (1) the ordinance was state action enacted pursuant
to the city's home rule powers and (2) the decision was one concerning
local government affairs which, by virtue of the tenth amendment, was
immune from federal control. 13 2 After City of Boulder was decided, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light
of the principles enunciated in City of Boulder.'33 On remand from the
Sixth Circuit,1 34 the district court found that there was a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition in
the disposal of garbage and, therefore, that the actions of the city of
Akron were entitled to state action immunity.1 36 The court did not, nor
was it asked to, reconsider the tenth amendment issue.
A later case, Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, concerned an antitrust challenge to Kansas City's provision for an ambulance service, an activity found by the court to be state action immune
from the federal antitrust laws."3 6 The district court in that case indicated in dictum that compliance with the federal antitrust laws would
directly impair the ability of the state of Missouri and the city of Kansas City to structure integral operations-namely, the provision of the
traditionally governmental function of providing for the health and wel37
fare of their citizens.1
If the immunity offered by the tenth amendment is ultimately held
to be available, the scope of immunity would still be less than municipalities desire due to the limited activities traditionally considered to
constitute integral government functions. For example, in Dove v.
Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority,"8 the Sixth
Circuit recently held that the operation of a regional mass transit system was not a traditional function of state and local governments and,
therefore, application of the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to bus drivers employed by the authority did not

132. Id.
133. 455 U.S. 931 (1982).
134. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,356 (N.D. Ohio
1983).
135. Id. T 65,356, at 70,122.
136. 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
137. Id. at 968. See also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that active state supervision of the conduct of a city performing a traditional municipal function, sewage-treatment services, is not required for the city's actions to be state action
exempt), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3891 (U.S. June 11, 1984) (No. 82-1832).
138. 701 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1983), vacating 539 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
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violate the tenth amendment.' The implications of that case are clear:
a regional mass transit system may well have monopoly power which
could, for example, lead to charges of predatory pricing. If the operation of a mass transit system is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, the
same must be true for many other proprietary activities. Thus, the possibility exists that the absence of a tenth amendment defense in this
and comparable situations may work to revive the governmental/proprietary distinction embraced by Chief Justice Burger in City of
40
Lafayette.1
V.

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF LITIGATING ANTITRUST SUITS AGAINST
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

A municipality's participation in many types of activities is typically a political question-a fact that will inevitably impact on litigation. Evidence of sordid practices in a private business context may be
easily confused with normal procedures in a public context. For example, meetings are commonly used as a forum for resolution of political
issues. Politics encourages talk, lobbying, and negotiation. The fact
finder's task will be to determine when such contacts, under section 1
of the Sherman Act, represent "contracts, combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade." Elective government routinely leads to fund-raising. The fact finder will be called upon to differentiate between political contributions and payoffs. Coalitions and caucuses resemble boycotts. Vote-trading looks like reciprocity. The harmful analogies are
endless, and the temptation to abuse precedent and dicta is almost
more than an advocate can be expected to resist or a court to
differentiate.
The fact that the antitrust defendant is a governmental entity may
also have a procedural impact on litigation. One possible ramification is
that relevant documents may be open to the public under equivalents of
the Freedom of Information Act' 4 ' or under state and local sunshine
laws.14 2 In addition, the law director of a governmental entity may be
named as a defendant in the litigation, perhaps thereby disqualifying
the entity's entire law department.
The costs of defense and protracted litigation may chill governmental decisionmaking. For example, even without a preliminary injunction and the requirement of a bond, the mere pendency of a case

139. Id. at 52 (citing Kramer v. New Castle Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982)
judgment also refusing to exempt a local public transit authority from the FLSA overtime provisions), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 786 (1983)).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
141. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
142. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page Supp. 1982).
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can preclude the sale of public bonds. Public funds cannot easily be
channeled to defend complex cases; the experience of the city of Richmond, Virginia, which has a total law department budget of $500,000
per year and which has spent over $800,000 in sixteen months defending a case on a hotel development, is troubling.
Finally, the question remains whether a successful plaintiff can
levy against governmental assets. If so, and those assets are insufficient
to satisfy the judgment, a court is theoretically faced with the prospect
of requiring new tax revenues, a function exclusively assigned by the
federal and state constitutions to the legislative branch of government.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Recent developments in the antitrust field have triggered new fears
of exposure for governmental entities engaging in activities traditionally acceptable in that context but arguably anticompetitive. The legal
fog of course extends well beyond the concerns of city, state, and federal entities to those private actors increasingly impacted by governmental decisions in the marketplace. All of these "competitors" today
coexist in a legal climate where the scope of liability is obscure and the
instances of immunity are unsettled.
With federally regulated industries, if a general conclusion can be
made as to the scope of statutory exemption from antitrust liability, it
is that the antitrust laws can be avoided only to the minimum extent

necessary to make a regulatory scheme function. The actions of federal
instrumentalities (not construed as "persons" under the terms of the
Sherman Act) and federally regulated industries must, however, be distinguished from the actions of state instrumentalities (construed as
"persons" under the terms of the Sherman Act). A consequence of the
courts' reading of only federal instrumentalities out of the Sherman
Act is that state instrumentalities will have to find alternative grounds
for exemption from the Act. For instance, such grounds have occasionally been found to derive from concepts of federalism, as instances of
"state action" have been held immune from the sweep of the Sherman
Act. Decisional law has narrowed the "state action" doctrine over time,
however, leaving the present bounds of immunity in doubt. Some cases
have required a showing that state or local programs are consistent
with a clearly and affirmatively expressed goal of state policy lawfully
to displace competition before immunity is found. Other cases have required more, at least when the restraint on commerce is one established
by a private party. In such cases there has arisen the additional requirement that there need be "active state supervision" of the state or
local program. And the "clear articulation" requirement was further
expanded upon by later case law which held that, if a state's constitution reflects a neutral position regarding municipal conduct taken pur-
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suant to home rule powers, the state's constitution will not be deemed
such a "clear articulation" of state policy as would grant immunity
from the antitrust laws.
Reaction has set in to the confusion surrounding the antitrust liability of governmental entities. Bills have been introduced at the federal
and state levels intended to clarify the scope of liability of state and
local governments. The familiar distinction between activities "governmental" and "proprietary" has again surfaced, with at least some precedent to the effect that state authorization would be necessary only in
the case of governmental involvement in proprietary activities. The
tenth amendment and more general principles of political accommodation might also shield some municipal activity in the provision of traditional and integral governmental services from antitrust scrutiny.
In the final analysis, any test gauging the scope of antitrust liability for governmental entities which articulates bright distinctions may
prove difficult in application. But it is clear that a workable test is necessary. The burgeoning growth and complexity of state and local governance mandates that governmental bodies have the ability to proceed
with certainty in activities traditionally open to the private sector. And
they must be able to proceed free of the "ominous specter" of unpredictable antitrust liability.
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